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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Parvin asserts that the district court erred when, after an
evidentiary hearing held on remand from the Idaho Court of Appeals, it denied him postconviction relief.

Specifically, he maintains that he established both deficient

performance and prejudice with respect to his claim that his attorney failed to ensure
that the Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") relief that he was originally given was
retained when that attorney failed to take any steps to have the Rule 35 motion ruled
upon while the district court still had jurisdiction.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State raises a number of arguments, none of which
is well-taken, and only three of which merit a reply.

One is that Mr. Parvin has not

properly raised a statutory ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to
cite to Idaho Code § 19-852 in his Petition or his Appellant's Brief. A second is that
Mr. Parvin cannot show deficient performance based on the State's claim that he
unilaterally amended his Petition via testimony at a supplemental evidentiary hearing
following remand and he cannot show deficient performance under the State's
formulation of a "new" claim. A third is that Mr. Parvin cannot show prejudice because
he could not have obtained Rule 35 relief without a contested hearing as, according to
the State, a district court's decision on a Rule 35 motion for leniency constitutes a
resentencing, which pursuant to the State's interpretation of the terms of his plea
agreement, was not permitted without the input of the victims and their families.
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This Reply Brief is necessary in order to dispose of the above-listed arguments.
Other arguments advanced by the State do not require responses, as they are
adequately addressed in the Appellant's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Parvin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
1.

May Mr. Parvin obtain post-conviction relief if he failed to cite to Idaho
Code § 19-852 in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or his Appellant's Brief?

2.

May the State amend a petitioner's post-conviction petition on appeal?

3.

Does a decision on a Rule 35 motion for leniency constitute a "resentencing,"
such that it requires a hearing?
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ARGUMENT
I.
A Petitioner Need Not Cite To Idaho Code § 19-852 In Order To Obtain Post-Conviction
Relief Based On A Claim Of Statutory Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
The State's first basis for opposing Mr. Parvin's appeal from the denial of his
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is that, when a Sixth Amendment basis for an
ineffective assistance claim does not lie, it is necessary that a petitioner specifically cite
Idaho Code § 19-852 in his petition, appellant's brief, or both in order to obtain relief. In
opposing Mr. Parvin's claim, the State argues,
At no time below, however, did Parvin ever assert that his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in relation to his Rule 35 motion was based on
the deprivation of his statutory right to counsel. (See,~, R., pp.?3, 81;
see also Tr.) Parvin likewise failed to invoke a statutory right in his
appellant's brief. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Under Idaho Code §
19-4903, petitioners for post-conviction relief are required to "specifically
set forth the grounds upon which the application is based." Because
Parvin failed to specifically set forth (or even generally set forth) the
deprivation of a statutory right as the basis for his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, no such claim should be considered on appeal.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) The State then argued that, even if the issue had been
preserved, precedent provides no basis for believing that post-conviction relief should
be "afforded . . . to a defendant seeking a routine reduction of sentence without the
submission of any new evidence or argument." (Respondent's Brief, p.?)
Aside from quoting a portion of Idaho Code § 19-4903 setting forth a requirement
that a petitioner provide the grounds upon which an application for post-conviction relief
is based, the State provides no authority for its argument that a petitioner must cite to
Idaho Code § 19-852 in order to pursue a claim of statutory ineffective assistance of
counsel.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.)

The State's partial quotation of Idaho
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Code § 19-4903 ignores the last sentence of that statute, which provides, "Argument,
citations, and discussions of authorities are unnecessary." I.C. § 19-4903.
The fatal problem, however, with the State's argument is that it ignores the Idaho
Court of Appeals' earlier opinion remanding this matter for the hearing from which this
appeal follows, including its conclusion that "[t]here is no question that Parvin has raised
a plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counselL]" and that "Parvin correctly notes
that he had received counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-852 for the Rule 35 motion, and, as
such, had a statutory right to effective counseL"

PalVin v. State, 2012 Unpublished

Opinion No. 453, pp.3, 4 n.1 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012).
Under the "law of the case" doctrine, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
Mr. Parvin's Petition contains a plausible claim of statutory ineffective assistance of
counsel under Idaho Code § 19-852 that necessitated remand for a decision on the
merits cannot be re-litigated in this appeal. See Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,
515-16 (2000) (applying "law of the case" doctrine, which "provides that 'upon an
appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the
case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court
and upon subsequent appeal," to final decisions of the Court of Appeals).
The second problem with the State's argument is that nowhere in his Verified
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief did Mr. Parvin limit his ineffective
assistance claim to one under the Sixth Amendment. His claim was that he received
"Ineffective Assistance of Counsel," with no mention of either the Sixth Amendment or
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Idaho Code § 19-852.

(R., p.73.)

Explaining his claim in more detail later in his

Petition, Mr. Parvin wrote,
Petitioner's attorney was deficient in failing to take action to ensure that
the District Court took timely action on the clearly meritorious motion to
reduce sentence. This failure resulted in a delay which, according to the
Court of Appeals, deprived the District Court of jurisdiction. Timely action
by Petitioner's attorney would have resulted in Petitioner's [sic] receiving
the just sentence he is entitled to, five to twenty years.
(R., p.81.) The third problem with the State's argument is that, in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Parvin discussed the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim
by quoting Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313 (Ct. App. 1995), a case involving a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's Brief,
p.7.) The final problem with the State's contention is that it completely ignores the
Idaho Supreme Court's insistence that Idaho Code § 19-852's "statutory right to counsel
would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel," with the Court continuing, "We can see no legitimate basis for
determining whether there has been a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has
been a violation of a similar constitutional right." Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685,
687 (1995). The Court then went on to note that the requirements for proving ineffective
assistance of counsel are: (1) establishing deficient performance by counsel, and (2)
demonstrating prejudice. Id. (citing Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988».
For all of these reasons, the State's argument that Mr. Parvin's statutory
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly before this Court is without merit.
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II.
The State May Not Amend A Petitioner's Post-Conviction Petition On Appeal
The State's next contention is that Mr. Parvin has failed to establish deficient
performance because
On remand, Parvin argued that his attorney was deficient, asserting that
he should have asked the district court to rule on the Rule 35 motion on
day 120, after filing the motion on day 119, in order to preserve the district
court's jurisdiction. (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-24.) But that is not what the standard
requires.

The district court lost jurisdiction to rule on Parvin's Rule 35 motion
because it delayed ruling on the motion for more than three months and
there was no adequate record for its delay, not because trial counsel
insufficiently nagged the court the day after he filed the Rule 35 motion.
Because Parvin failed to prove that his counsel was objectively deficient in
regards to his Rule 35 motion, his claim was correctly denied.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-11.)
The key problem with the State's argument is that it takes testimony provided by
Mr. Parvin at a supplemental evidentiary hearing held following remand, and attempts to
amend Mr. Parvin's Petition by reference to that testimony. It may seem fairly obvious,
but Mr. Parvin will note that it is the petitioner who decides what issues to raise in a
petition for post-conviction relief, not the State. See I.C. § 19-4903 ("The application
shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted . . . [and] shall
identify all previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by
the applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence.") (emphasis added). Even

assuming that Mr. Parvin's testimony was an attempt to amend his Petition, he would
have needed leave from the district court to do so. See I.C. § 19-4906(a) ("The court
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may make appropriate orders for amendment of the application . . . . ") (emphasis

added).
The other problem with the State's argument is that, even assuming the State
may amend Mr. Parvin's Petition on appeal (or may argue that Mr. Parvin unilaterally
did so via his testimony at the supplemental evidentiary hearing), a review of that
testimony in context reveals that Mr. Parvin and post-conviction counsel were merely
providing information as to his defense attorney's total failure to precipitate timely action
on the Rule 35 motion, which constituted deficient performance. The testimony cited to
by the State, when the testimony immediately preceding and following the cited portion
of the transcript is included,1 reads as follows:
And through the procedural history, which this Court has
[Counsel:]
taken judicial notice of - it's a long history - the long and the short of it is
at one point the Court of Appeals held Judge Mortitt had lost jurisdiction
because he did not act upon the Rule 35 in a timely matter [sic]; is that
correct?

[Mr. Parvin:] That's correct.
[Counsel:]
Now, we've talked about the fact that you requested
Mr. Onanubosi to file the Rule 35?
[Mr. Parvin:] Yes.
[Counsel:]
And basically [it] was filed 119 days before [sic] the judgment
was issued, correct?
[Mr. Parvin:] Correct.
[Counsel:]
And then, that one additional day that Judge Morfitt still had
remaining jurisdiction, to the best of your knowledge, Mr. Onanubosi did
not come in and speak to Judge Morfitt about making a ruling on that day
while he still had jurisdiction; is that right?
[Mr. Parvin:] Not that I'm aware of, no.

1

The portions of the transcript not cited by the State are italicized.
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[Counsel:]
And to the best of your knowledge or to your opinion, if the
Rule 35 had been filed in a more timely fashion, and had Mr. Onanubosi
followed up and made sure that Judge Morfitt ruled while he still had
jurisdiction, is it your opinion that, but for that, the relief that you requested
would have been granted and been valid?
[Mr. Parvin:] Yes, I believe it would have been.
[Counsel:]
Okay. And but for the fact that it was not ruled upon
because your counsel failed to make sure that Judge Morfitt ruled in a
timely manner, the Court lost jurisdiction?
[Mr. Parvin:] That is correct.
(Tr., p.12, LA - p.13, L.12 (emphases added).) In proper context, then, it is clear that
Mr. Parvin was not attempting to modify his sole post-conviction claim, namely, that his
attorney was ineffective for failing to take steps to ensure that his Rule 35 motion was
decided before the district court lost jurisdiction.
In light of the complete lack of authority for the State's argument, as well as the
lack of any indication that Mr. Parvin sought - let alone received the district court's
permission - to amend his Petition via testimony at a supplemental evidentiary hearing
on remand, Mr. Parvin asserts that the State's argument is without merit.

III.
A Decision On A Rule 35 Motion For Leniency Does Not Constitute A "Resentencing,"
Requiring A Hearing
The last of the State's argument that necessitates a reply is that Mr. Parvin
cannot establish prejudice because "under the peculiar facts of this case, the district
court could not grant Parvin Rule 35 relief absent a contested hearing" because one of
the conditions of the plea agreement was "that all of Parvin's victims, including their
immediate family members, would be present and permitted to testify at sentencing."
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(Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

The State

completed its argument by explaining,
To resentence Parvin without granting the victims and their families the
right to be present and to testify would be a breach of Parvin's plea
agreement. Parvin's plea agreement required the district court to hold a
contested hearing before it could reduce his sentencelJ and upon holding
that contested hearing the district court did not grant Parvin's motion.
(Respondent's Brief, p.15 (emphasis added).)
The key problem with the State's argument is that it ignores the plain text of
Idaho Criminal Rule 35, which, in relevant part provides, "Motions to correct or modify
sentence under this rule ... shall be

consider~d

and determined by the court without

the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise
ordered by the court in its discretion." I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis added); see also LC.R.
43( c) ("A defendant need not be present in the following situations unless otherwise
ordered by the court ... (4) At a reduction of sentence under Rule 35."); I.C. § 19-2503
("For the purpose of judgment, if the conviction is for a felony, the defendant must be
personally present"). In light of the clear statutes and rules on the matter, a decision to
grant or deny a Rule 35 motion for leniency is not a "resentenc[ing]" necessitating a
hearing, let alone one at which any victims and the defendant need be present.
Because a district court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 35 motion for leniency
is not a "resentenc[ing]," the State's argument that Mr. Parvin could not prove prejudice

Mr. Parvin will not address this portion of the State's argument, as the State cites to
nothing in the record to indicate that the plea agreement included a requirement that a
contested hearing be held prior to the district court ruling on a Rule 35 motion for
leniency. See I.A.R. 35(b)(6) ("The argument shall contain the contentions of the
respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.")
(emphasis added).
2
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because the granting of his motion required a hearing at which the victims and their
family members were present is not well-taken. 3

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appel/ant's Brief, Mr. Parvin
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment of dismissal as
to his Rule 35 claim, and remand this matter for entry of an order reinstating the district
court's order granting Rule 35 relief, in which it reduced his sentence from life, with ten
years fixed, to a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2014.

J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

3 To the extent that the State may be advancing an argument that, under the statutory
and constitutional provisions granting rights to Idaho crime victims, crime victims have
special rights in Rule 35 proceedings not provided to a criminal defendant, such an
argument should be rejected on due process grounds. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412
U.S. 470 (1973) (one-sided procedural rules that benefit the state violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
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